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I. INTRODUCTION
Recognizing tne relationsnip between policies and
mechanisms has been a problem in tne specification and
design of many computer systems. What is needed is a simple
methodology for assessing the suitability of a protection
mechanism to enforce a non-discretionary security policy.
Such a methodology, based upon the entity-relationship model
and designed with validation of security enforcement as its
primary objective, is presented.
Defined as the assignment technique, this mathematically
oriented metnodology establishes a relationship between the
information sensitivities of the systems entities
(partitioned according to the policy constraints), to
dominance domains (inherently established by a mechanism).
The assignment technique provides a means for mechanism
sufficiency validation, since the results of the assignment
can be evaluated to determine wnetner the constraints of tne
policy are met.
Mechanisms are defined as procedural specifications that
prevent the occurrence of operations. Protection mechanisms,
then control a subject's access to an object, by adhering to
some procedural specification of access rules. Policies,
however, are generally stated in a non-procedural form. This
8

leads to a problem in translating policies into mechanisms,
and in verifying the accuracy of this translation.
Only non-discretionary security policies are discussed
in detail. Such policies, however, are extremely important
wnen dealing with protection of business information as well
as National Security. Computer systems designed to provide
Command, Control and Communications must rely upon effective
non-discretionary security if they are to be of any value to
National Defense [lj . Compromise and subversion policies [2J
precisely define the requirements, but the suitability of a
protection mechanism to meet these requirements is not
always apparent. A theoretical foundation from which this
suitability may be simply and readily derived is
established.
A. BACKGROUND
Non-discretionary policies for tne security of sensitive
information have existed throughout the annals of history.
The basis of these policies lies in a subject (i.e., an
active entity) being prohibited modification or observation
of an object (i.e., a repository for information or inactive
entity) based upon the subject's membership in a specified
group. This grouping is established external to the system
in which it will be used.
The first computer systems dealt with the problem of
security by establishing physical protection perimeters.

Walls, loclrs and marines with rifles provided the
environment necessary for system security. Tnis was an
acceptable procedure because there were relatively few users
of tne system and eacn user was trusted not to violate tne
security policies. Security was an issue external to tne
computer itself.
However, as computer technology became more
sophisticated, user expectations increased. Policy-maKers
established security policies and expected their machines to
adhere to them without exception. The security perimeters
that had been established external to tne computer, were now
to be established internally.
This led to two fields of research. One group, the
experimentalists, attempted to design ingeniously contrived
mechanisms with little or no concern for tne policies which
their mechanism would support. Mathematicians, on the other
hand, set about tne tasfc of modeling policies in a fashion
that would establish a foundation for the procedural
specification of protection mechanisms. The relationship
between these models and the mechanisms was not always
clear.
What is needed, and what is presented nere, is a simple,
complete and consistent means of establishing that a
mechanism actually enforces the policy-maicers
'
specifications. This is done by first giving the
policy-mater a tool to precisely describe his policy and
10

then giving the systems designers and analysts a technique
to evaluate the sufficiency of their mecftanism to support
tnis policy.
A careful examination of tne fundamental nature of
non-discretionary security policies and protection
mecnanisms is made. Tnis examination is based largely upon
tne findings of research associated with security Kernel
tecnnology [3J . Tne results of this examination snow wnat it
is about mechanisms that actually provides the protection
and what protection is actually provided. In so doins>, a
theoretical mathematical foundation is established from
which the science of secure computation may proceed to meet
the requirements of the policy-mafcer in a simple, elegant
and efficient manner.
B. RELATED WORK
Research in establishing the suitability of protection
mechanisms to meet non-discretionary security policies is
practically non-existent. Protection mechanisms are usually
presented in an informal manner with implementation details
dominating the discussion [4] . Policies, on the other hand,
are generated by persons wno rarely give consideration to
the implementation of these policies in a computer system.
The disparity between these two groups has led to little
research in methodologies for bridging the broad gap between
11

security policies and protection mecnanisms, and even less
results.
The notion of domains originated witn Dennis and Van
Horn [5J and tneir concept of spneres of protection. Tnis
idea was improved upon by Lampson [6,?J wno coined the term
"domain" and noted tne usefulness of domains as a conceptual
tool for understanding protection mecnanisms. Scnroeder [Sj
made use of tnese ideas to design a protection mecnanism
that would allow mutually suspicious subsystems to cooperate
in a single computation.
Popes [9J modeled tne nature of access control witn ni
s
restriction srraphs. Bell and LaPadula [10] made a
significant contribution wnen tney identified a matnematical
framework within which to deal witn tne problems of secure
computer systems. Tneir work was based upon general syste-ns
theory and finite state automata. Furtek [ll J estatiisned a
similar, less Known, matnematical framework based upon tne
theory of constraints. Tne Bell and LaPaauia work was
followed by Walters [12J development of a lattice model for
security policies. This model was refined and later
popularized by Denning [13] such that today, nearly all
practical policies nave been recognized as lattice policies.
Saltzer and Schroeder [14] presented a tutorial on tne
basic principles of protection in computer systems. Conen
[15], however, provides a far more rieorous discussion of
protection mecnanisms wnile Gronns' [16J researcn provides
12

considerable insight into a number of details regarding
access relations.
Mucn of tnis early wort was directed towards tne
solution of tne computer security problem in National
Defense [12,17J. As sucn, tne autnors rarely diseased tne
motivation for their efforts. It was Scnell UJ , However,
wno dramatically described tne importance of tne computer
security in a modern electronic environment. Recognition of
tne significance of tnis problem motivated tne researcn
reported here.
C. ORGANIZATION
The relationship between security policies and
protection mechanisms is not obvious. In order to explore
this relationship, one must clarify tne meaning of security
and protection. Only by methodically examining each and
every pertinent principle can one nope to establish a
mathematical framework which unifies the security policy
issues with the protection mecnanisms' design.
The nature of non-discretionary security policies is
considered first. The meaning of access relations is
explored and commonly fcnown policies are discussed.
Next, a formalized notion of domains is presented. A
succinct mathematical definition of a domain is offered. The
notion of an (access-mode) domain and dominance domains are
13

introduced as tools for precisely cbaracterizing protection
mechanisms.
Section four discusses tne tneoretical basis for
assignment. The assignment technique is explained and a
means for simplifying tne tne number of assignment schemes
needed to establish the insufficiency of a mechanism to
support some particular policy is derived.
Section five presents detailed applications of simple
assignment snowin? the usefulness of the assignment
tecnnique particularly witn respect to mecnanism sufficiency
validation. Section five dispells much of the mystery that
surrounds tne ad hoc design of secure computer systems.
Every attempt has been made to provide the reader with a
clear understanding of the principles of the assignment
technique. Readers are encouraged to question these findings
and indeed, the fundamentals upon which they are based. Only
in so doing, can one nope to grasp the meaning of the
principles presented and the utility of the assignment




II . NON-DISCRETIONARY SECURITY POLICIES
This section provides a detailed examination as to tne
nature of non-discretionary security policies after first
discussing several pertinent concepts concerning policies in
general. Some of tne issues presented may appear to confuse
policy issues with mechanism issues. Hopefully, tnis
confusion will be resolved as tne reader obtains a tnorougn
understanding of tne innerently isomorpnic nature of
policies and mechanisms, as substantiated in tne ensuing
discussion.
A. THE NATORE OF K POLICY
The fundamental nature of a policy has not been clearly
established in tne Computer Science field. For example,
Wulf, Cohen, Jones and others surest that a policy is a
mecnanism vnen discussing HYDRA [1SJ . Jones subsequently
discusses ho* protection mechanisms can be used to enforce
security policies [19J . On the otner nand , Cohen defines a
policy as a problem in his doctoral dissertation [15] but,
enumerates several protection problems associated with one
security policy [15 J . Such confusion among such a closely
related eroup of computer scientists specializing in




Snyder [20J mates note of tnis problem staling tnat
capability-based protection systems designers rarely
consider the security policies their system may implement.
Throughout the computer security literature, one may observe
that the nature of a policy and how it relates to the
protection issues discussed, is often ignored. Fernaps tnis
is because the nature of security policies themselves, and
the suitability of protection mechanisms to meet these
policies is not clearly understood. It is the intent of this
autnor to address this problem. In order to do so, one
besrins by formalizin* the notion of a policy.
A policy is a specification of benavior. Such a
specification constrains the activities within a system by
establishing a distinction between acceptable and
unacceptable behavior for some set of classes established by
the policy. When dealing with the security issue, the
classes (i.e., access classes) are simply labels which the
policy uses to distinguish between eroups of system
entities. So a security policy specifies a set of access
classes and identifies tne acceptable behavior between them.
Enforcement of policies may be realized in a number of
ways. In general, any means of security enforcement internal
to the computer, may be considered to be a protection




Tne term benavior generally implies mat an active
entity is dealing with some other entity or entities. So one
can distingui stt between two types of entities witn respect
to security policy specifications. One type is tnose
entities wnose benavior is being controlled. Tnese are tne
active entities within tne system and are referred to as
"subjects". Tne otner type is tnose witn wnicn tne subject
interacts during execution tnat are not subjects, but rather
are simply repositories of information [12J . These are tne
passive entities within the system referred to as "objects".
A process is characterized by an address space and an
execution point or state of its virtual processor. It is
important to note tne distinction between processes and
subjects as these two terms are often incorrectly considered
to be synonyomous. A subject is implemented as a
process-domain pair [6,7,8] . One must tafce care not to
confuse tnese two terms.
Much confusion has been associated with the issue of
policy enforcement. A policy may be completely enforced in a
system, partially enforced in a system or not enforced at
all. Partial enforcement applies only to complex policies
for wnicn sub-policies can be formulated and enforced.
Partial enforcement does not imply enforcement of a policy
only under certain conditions, or at certain times, wnicn
is, in fact, no enforcement at all. Partial enforcement
17

refers to enforcement of a sub-policy witnin tne context of
the overall policy.
Policies are not problems [15J . Problems occur only in
the implementation of a policy and are used to descrice
pitfalls in tne enforcement of some policy of interest.
Applying some policy to a system mates no changes to
tnat system at tne time of application. Tnis means tnat
policies do not initially alter the entities with which they
deal. Rather, entities are assigned to an access class
according to the policy. If an entity is assigned to an
access class sucn tnat its attributes require modification,
or its relationships are invalid, or the entity itself does
not belong within tne system, tne system is not in
compliance with the policy. Action may be ta&en later to
bring tne system into compliance, but simply associating tne
policy with the system, in effect, only labels tne system
entities.
Recognizing the nature of a policy is important if one
is interested in enforcement of policies in computer
systems. This is because tne logical nature of a computing
device dictates a logical specification of policy. Having
clearly described tne nature of a policy in general, cne may




Security policies are generally grouped into two broad
classes. Non-discretionary security policies (sometimes
referred to as mandatory policies), are policies which fix
tne classification of information sensitivities and
establish all permissible access relations (viz., subjects
gaining some form of access to objects) according to tnese
information sensitivities. Sucn a policy is generally
considered to externally constrain wnat access is
permissible [3 J . Enforcement of a policy requires that tie
sensitivity of ail objects and tne autnorizat ions of all
subjects be clearly identified.
Discretionary policies, in a sense, provide a finer
granularity of access control witnin tne constraints of tne
non-discretionary policies of the system [3] . Authorization
to access information and specification of source
information access classes are made outside of the computer
environment. A policy is discretionary wnen a subject with
access to an object may exercise its discretion in making
tnat object available to some otner subject. As sucn, tne
information sensitivity of an object is decided in a
discretionary or arbitrary manner. This tends to produce
"spaghetti howl" policies where tne information
sensitivities of objects is not easy to determine. The
sensitivity of objects is constantly changing in an
arbitrary manner which may not be readily observable or
19

controllable. Sucn policies are not practical wnen dealing
witn many of tne National Defense issues. Because of their
United utility, discretionary policies are not as
interesting as non-discretionary policies nor is their
enforcement sucn a critical issue.
Only non-discretionary security policies are examined in
tnis discussion. It is snown tnat all non-discretionary
security policies can be represented as lattice security
policies.
C. LATTICE SECURITY POLICIES
A number of non-discretionary security policies have
already been described as lattice policies [12,21j. As sucn t
the precise form of the lattice structure is helpful in
understanding tne nature of tne policy [19J .
A universally bounded lattice is a mathematical
structure consisting of a finite, partially ordered set for
which there exists precisely one least common upper element
(i.e., tne least upper bound (LUB)) and precisely one
greatest common lower element (i.e., the greatest lower
bound (GLB)) [22,23j . A partially ordered set, is a set, 0,
for which a relation, R, is applied to Q such that R is
reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive [22j . For example,
consider the set = { q., q „, q . q, } and the relation R12 3 4
applied to Q sucn tnat q Rq (i.e., q is related to q ty12 1 2
relation R), q Rq , q Rq , q Rq , and q Rq . The relation R131424 34
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foms a lattice on tne set witn q as tne GLB and q as
1 4
the LUB.
When discussing lattice security policies, one
recognizes trie set as the set of access classes
established by the policy. The access relation R, however,
may vary significantly from policy to policy. This fact is
not so well recognized. Dennin^s information flow model
[13J , for example, describes a flow relation, "—V, defined
on pairs of access classes such that for classes A and B, A
—^ 3 if and only if information in class A is permitted to
flow into class B. This relation applies to compromise and
subversion policies, for example, but is meaningless wnen
discussins proeram integrity.
Tnree relations between access classes are generally
sufficient to describe the specifications of any
non-discretionary security policy. For access classes A and
B, these are :
A > B Information of access class A
is more sensitive tnan
information of access class B
A = B Information of access class A
is of the same sensitivity as
information of access class B
A n B Information of access class A
is in no way related to
information of access class B
The notion of sensitivity may be easily confused wnen
discussing several policies. Tnis is because the term taices
21

its meaning from the policy in question and cannot be
readily associated witn two diverse policies. For example,
an object may be > a subject S witn respect to one policy,
# witn respect to anotner policy, and S > witn respect to
still anotner policy. Sensitivity, tnen, may not be useful
for discussing multiple policy issues. It is nowever, a
useful intuitive term for describing the lattice nature of a
policy.
This autnor advances the nypotnesis tbat all
non-discretionary security policies may be represented as
lattice policies. A. simple argument is offered in support of
tnis Hypothesis as a complete proof has not been developed.
Non-discretionary security policies are estaciisned
external to the computer system environment. As sucn, they
define some form of benavior between subjects and objects
from which the system may not deviate without external
authoritative approval. The system entities (i.e., tne
subjects and objects) must be clearly labeled or ctnerwise
identified witn respect to the policy. Grouping tnose system
entities whose labels are identical, one may establish a set
of equivalence classes which completely partition the
systems' entities. One may tninfc of tnese equivalence
classes as labeled by the access classes. Such a




One nay then examine the relations between access
classes with respect to the policies. Enumerating all tne
relations between access classes, one may draw a .eraph, such
as that shown in figure 1, with nodes signifying access
classes and arcs signifying that the access class of the
higher node (i.e., closer to the top of the pa,?e) is more
sensitive (>) than the access class of tne lower node.
Transitive relations nsed not be drawn as their inclusion is
implicit and does not affect the graph.
Figure 1. Disjoint Partially Ordered Sets and Nodes
If any cycles are discovered, in an attempt to construct
tne graph, one may see that tne specification of policy is
not enforceable. That is to say, for some cycle of access
classes A>B>...>Z>A, the information sensitivity of
some access class A is at the same time > A and = A. This is
a paradox. Attempting to enforce such a specification is
intuitively nonsense! So if one is to have a
non-discretionary security policy, viz., one wnicn is to be
enforced in a mandatory fashion, one may safely assume that
the policy will specify no cyclic relations among tne access
23

classes. Therefore, one may categorically state tnat trie
graph of any enforceable non-discretionary security policy
will never contain any cycles.
Furtner examining tne grapn, one can observe tnat only
two general structures may exist. Tne first consists of
unrelated nodes (i.e., tnose nodes wnicn are singletons
representing access classes wi tn no relations to other
access classes in the ?raph). Tne other structures are
partially ordered sets (some of whicn may be a lattice).
Figure 2. lattice Structure
If tne grapn does not contain a least upper bound,
(LOB), one may arbitrarily create an access class so
designated and establisn tne appropriate relations with
respect to its sensitivity (see figure 2). This access class
may also be referred to as tne "system nigh." Likewise, one
may do the same for the greatest lower bound (GLB) which is
generally Known as tne "system low." Note that, neither tne
24:

LUB nor tae GLB need, nave any entities associated with their
access class. By forming this structure, one has established
a lattice.
Thus, all non-discretionary security policies are
lattice security policies. Non-discretionary security
specifications that venerate cyclic structures are not well
formed policies and as sucn f tneir enforcement cannot be
evaluated nor can one consider such a specification to be a
policy worthy of discussion.
D. SIMPLE LATTICE SECURITY POLICIES
A policy is a "simple lattice policy" when the policy
establishes either one of two basic lattice structures. The
first structure is formed by a simply ordered (viz.,
linearly ordered or totally ordered) set of access classes.
For example, some policy mignt establish a simply ordered
structure where SECRET is more sensitive than (>)
CONFIDENTIAL > UNCLASSIFIED. Policies with simply ordered
sets of access classes are called "hierarchical policies."
The other basic lattice structure is formed by a
mutually exclusive set of access classes. For example, some
policy might establish a mutually exclusive structure where
CRYPTO is not related to (*) NATO # NUCLEAR. Those policies
with mutually exclusive sets are called "category policies."
One should note that, a "compartment" access class, e.ff.,
CRYPTO-NATO, is formed when some restricted form of access
25

is available to two or more otnerwise mutually exclusive
categories of information.
Recall that a lattice security policy partitions the
systems entities with respect to their information sensitiv-
ities, into a set of equivalence classes tnat can be labeled
by tne access classes. Consider any two lattice security
policies, P and P , and some system containing a non-empty
set of entities, A. When P is applied to tne system,
a partition, tt , is established creatine the set of
equivalence classes, { e . e . . .
.
, e , . . . , e }. Applying12 i n
P
2
to this system so partitioned, refines the system
producing a unique partitioning tt . tt tnen, is simply tne
product of i., the partition induced by P and tt , the
partition induced by P„ . So for each e , an equivalence
class created by P,, a new set of equivalence classes,
{ e.,, e. , ..., e. >, is produced. Tne partitionil T iz T in e r
tt forms a lattice, viz., that induced by the composite
policy P.
It readily follows that all lattice security policies
are the product of one or more simple lattice policies. The
total non-discretionary security package for a system then,
consists of some set of simple lattice security policies
successively refining the systems entities, none of which
may produce conflicting policies. This is shown to be
particularly useful Knowledge when one attempts to use the




Any specific non-discretionary security policy will
distinguish one or mor? distinct access relations between
subjects and objects. Associated witn tnese distinctions one
may derive, where not otnerwise specified, tne set of
"access rights" wnicn may be accorded to tne subject. Tnese
access rights specify tne liberties wbicn the subjects may
tate witn respect to tnese objects. Access rignts are
typically mirrored in the "access modes" of the
corresponding protection mechanism. Although there exists a
fine difference between an "access right" and an "access
mode", viz., "access rights" are associated with security
policies and "access modes" are associated witn tne
protection mechanisms wnich enforce the policy, this
discussion frequently refers to an "access right" as an
"access mode" because it is the access mode which must
inevitably be questioned when evaluating the enforcement of
a security policy.
The enforcement of a policy is fundamentally limited by
tne system's granularity of access which may also be thought
of as the system's variety or richness of access modes.
Policies that prescribe distinctions not recognized by the
access control mechanisms must be enforced in an overly
restrictive manner or ignored. For example, a policy
addressing a concatenation access relation cannot be
2?

precisely enforce! on a system that does not recognize some
form of append access mode.
The basis of all security enforcement evaluation lies in
tne acceptability of an access relation. An access relation
is defined as a tuple (subject, access mode, object). This
tuple signifies that a relation between tne subject and
object exist such that the suDject is permitted to access
the object with all the privileges associated with the
access mode. The problem of information security may
generally be expressed as the problem of permitting the
existence of only those access relations that in no way
violate any of the applicable systems policies.
One can see then, that the granularity of access control
within a system is dependent upon the ability to distinguish
attributes of subjects and objects plus the distinct access
modes available. The primitive access modes (i.e., those
access modes tnat are not decomposable by the system)
associated with the design of the system, including the
protection mechanisms, designate the associated rights
accorded to an access request.
When tne granularity of access is successively refined,
one may observe two conflicting phenomena. First, the
ability to distinguish between access relations is more
pronounced, thus allowing for greater sophistication and
variety in policy formulation. The problem, however, is that
the increased distinctions of access relations increases tae
28

complexity of the security evaluation process. Systems
designers are face! witn tne problem of striding a balance
between tne granularity of access and tne complexity of
system security validation.
This nas not deterred tne efforts of many systems
designers, However, as tne granularity of subjects and
objects is quite refined in many systems. Unfortunately,
sucn systems, almost witnout exception, nave failed to
enforce even minimal non-discretionary security policies.
Two generic access modes are particularly useful in tne
discussion of security. These are [16J "observe" (the
ability to observe information) and "modify" (the ability to
modify information). Other access modes may be generally
thought of as a finer granularity of tnese two access modes.
Figure 3 illustrates one sucn possible set of primitive
access modes and how they are associated with the generic
access modes.
Observe Modify
Read Execute Write Append
Figure 3. Generic Access Modes
The problem of computer security enforcement can be
reduced to the problem of limiting the access relations
within the system to only those tnat neither directly nor
29

indirectly violate the systems security policies. If one can
establish that all of the access relations permitted in tie
system are acceptable to the policy, one has established
that the system is "secure."
F. ILLUSTRATION OF POLICIES
In reviewing tne computer science literature, tnis
author was unable to discover any illustration forms
appropriate for showing the features of non-discretionary
security policies in sufficient detail that one could
readily discern all permissible access relations within the
system simply by examining the illustration alone. This
section presents a review of the major forms examined and
their failure to adequately illustrate access relations. It
also provides two proposed alternative forms that more
clearly illustrate access relations of a system in a manner
which leaves no doubt as to the nature of the policy and the




Figure 4. Basic Lattice Form
Figure 4 shows a representation for a lattice structure
commonly found in mathematical texts [22,23j . With respect
30

to lattice security policies, each node represents an access
class and the arcs signify tnat the node nearer the top of
tne page represents an access class which is more sensitive
than tne lower nodes' access class. Thus, in figure 4 one
may observe that A. > D and B # A. Sometimes these arcs are
labeled by ">" symbols, but this merely tends to clutter the
illustration and provides no additional information. Note
that this form provides no information re^ardin* access
relations without some examination of tne policy that is
being illustrated, e.g., one cannot readily answer the
question "can a subject of access class A write to an object
of access class D?"
The form shown in figure 5 [12,13] , provides basically
tne same information. This form illustrates tne permissible
information flow that is immediate and non-reflexive by
means of directed arcs. Nodes are once again used to
represent access classes. Access relations are still
non-discernible by examination of tne illustration alone.
!X!x$\t
Figure 5. Information Flow Form
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Another form which is popular in capability-based
protection systems researcn [24j , illustrated in figure 6,
is called a protection grapn [20J . Tnese graphs specify each
subject as a solid node, "t", and each object as an empty
node, "0". Tne directed arcs between nodes specify tae
access risrhts of the source by the associated labels. This
form provides an extremely detailed means of representing
all access relations within the system. Unfortunately, this
form provides such detail that an illustration of any
practical system becomes exceedingly busy. Thus one quicfcly
loses the ability to distinguisn between access classes even
when they are clearly labeled. What is needed is needed is a




















Fiarure 6. Protection Graphs [20]
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Figure 7 represents the first illustration forn proposed
by tnis author called aa "access relation graph". In tnis
forn, eacti node represents an access class as specified by
tne policy. All non-reflexive immediate access relations
[13] between access classes (except tnose tnat may be
establisned by forming a transitive closure over some given
access mode(s)) are grouped by access mode and shown as
directed arcs labeled by the associated access mode(s). This
form solves tne problem of the protection graph for
non-discretionary security policy representation by
providing tne minimum information necessary for one to fully






Figure 7. Access Relation Graph
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An access relation ^rapn clearly snows ail permissible
access relations specified by a non-discretionary security
policy. Reflexive relations, i.e.* tnose with a subject of
the same access class as the object, need never be
specifically cited unless all access modes are not permitted
witnin an access class. Antisymmetric relations are clearly
defined by tne directed arcs. Transitive relations are
inferred from tne patn of two or more antisymmetric
relations (viz., in figure 7 a subject of tne LUB access
class may read from an object of tne SLB access class).
Therefore, tne form meets tne mathematical requirements for
a lattice in that, all access relations for the lattice
(i.e., a universally bounded partially ordered set) are
clearly illustrated.
In its most delineated case, the access relation graph
is reduced to a protection eraph. The advantage of the
access relation graph over tne protection graph is
simplicity. Only the access relations needed to represent
tne policy are snown. Additionally, complex policies and
composite policies are illustrated in one simplified form.
Another illustration form tnat is particularly useful
when discussing uniform lattice structures (i.e., those
access relation graphs where tne access modes between any
two antisymmetric access classes are identical) is the
linear access sraph. Such a erapn shows the security
label(s) of the objects (i.e., how one represents the
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sensitivity of the object) and denotes the access modes
available to subjects of varying sensitivity witn respect to
the sensitivity of tne objects. Figure 9(A) illustrates a
simple general linear access grapn. In tnis figure, subjects
with greater sensitivity than the objects sensitivity would
enjoy the use of access mode(s) 2 when referencing that
object. Subjects of inferior sensitivity than the objects
sensitivity would enjoy the use of access mode(s) 1 when
referencing that object. Subjects of the same sensitivity as
the object would enjoy access modes 1 and 2 when referencing
the object. The linear access grapn for tne Multics Ring
Brackets, first pointed out to the author by R. Schell, is
shown as an example of a familiar policy represented in this















call as a gate
(B)
Figure S. Linear Access Graphs
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The disadvantage of tne linear access grapn is tnat it
may only be used for illustration of uniform policies, i.e.,
tnose policies wnere tne access relations between any two
access classes (one of wnicn is more sensitive than the
otner) are identical. Tne succinct nature of tnis form,
however, mates it possible to capture the essence of a class
of policies, i.e., those which may be described by the same
linear access graph, without going into all the details.
G. EXAMPLE POLICIES
Having discussed the nature of policies in general, one
is now prepared to examine several specific policies of
interest. Such a discussion logically begins with the two










Fisrure 9. Compromise Policy.
A compromise policy, sometimes referred to simply as a
security policy, is one wnose primary intent is to pronibit
the unauthorized observation of information. Figure 9 show
the general form of such a policy. Subjects may observe only
those objects whose sensitivity is less than or equal to the
subject's sensitivity in order to prevent direct observation
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of an object by an unauthorized subject, viz., tne Simple
Security Condition [10J . In order to prevent indirect
observation of objects by unautnorized subjects, a
sufficient but not necessary condition establishes that
modification of objects must at least be limited to tnose
subjects whose sensitivity is less than or equal to the
objects sensitivity, viz., tne (Security) Confinement
Property — also &nown by a less descriptive title as the
^-Property [10] .
A subversion policy, sometimes referred to simply as an
integrity policy, is the dual of a compromise policy. The
primary interest of a subversion policy is to prohibit the
unauthorized modification of information. Figure 10
illustrates these general characteristics. Subjects may
modify only those objects whose sensitivity is less than or
equal to the subject's sensitivity in order to prevent
direct modification of an object by an unautnorized subject,
viz., the Simple Integrity Condition [21J . In order to
prevent indirect modification of objects by unauthorized
subjects, a sufficient but not necessary condition is that
observation of objects must be limited to tnose subjects
whose sensitivity is less than or equal to the object's
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Figure 10. Subversion Policy.
Tne importance of subversion policies snould not be
underestimated [2,21]. Changing the course of an ICBM, for
example, snould in most cases require a more sensitive
authorization tnan simply knowing its course. Sucn policies,
nowever, are often overlooked in many Command, Control, and
Communications systems [2]
.
Anotner general class of policies tnat is of general
interest in Security Kernel researcn, and whose title was
coined during tne course of this researcn effort by R.
Schell, are the "Program Integrity" policies [4J . The notion
of program integrity stems from tne desire to pronlhit
unauthorized modification of executable programs by less
trustworthy subjects. In the general case, one wisnes to
ensure that the more sensitive programs are "tamperproof .
"
In other words, one wants to be sure tnat tne program can be
"trusted" to perform as specified and can not be "tric&ed"
by merely reading data of lower sensitivity or "importance."
For example, a system designer/programmer may wish to insure
that his programs always perform as specified in botn his
test environment and in any application environment. Unlifce
a strict integrity policy [21J , program integrity is not
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concerned witti the issue of general observation of
information. Program integrity is tnerefore less
conservative (and tnus more "ristty") tnan Bibas integrity
policy. Program integrity deals only with execution and
modification of information. As sucn, figure 11 illustrates









Figure 11. Program Integrity Policy.
One may guarantee that no direct modification of a
program by an unauthorized subject (i.e., a direct threat^
is possible by enforcement of the following condition :
Simple Program Integrity Condition : If a subject
has modify access to an object, then tne program
integrity of the subject is greater than or equal
to tne program integrity of tne object.
Because program integrity policies are concerned with
tne execution issue (versus tne observation issue [21J )
,
indirect modification of information is not strictly
pronibited. This provides a certain degree of flexibility,
but also produces a certain amount of ristc [19] . Confinement
of execution reduces the ris& of sucn an indirect tnreat but
does not eliminate it. A more sensitive subject must he
trusted not to modify a less sensitive object either
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intentionally or otnerwise. An indirect tnreat occurs wnen a
subject executes a program that has been modified by a less
trustvortny subject, tnerefore, one wisnes to confine tne
execution access relations. The confinement property for
program integrity is defined as follows :
Program Integrity Confinement Property : If a
subject nas execute access to an object, then tne
program integrity of tne object is greater than or
equal to the program integrity of the subject.
The remainder of the section discusses tnree policies of
general interest to federal ADP users. Any computer system
designed for use by the federal government, should as a
minimum, consider its ability to enforce these policies.
1 . National Security Policy
The National Security Policy classifies information
essential to the National Defense or foreign relations of
the United States. The President of tne United States
established this policy in Executive Order Number 12065
dated June 26, 1378 [25]. This order defines three levels of
classification as follows :
TOP SECRET : That information or material the
unautnorized disclosure of wnicn could reasonably
be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to
the national security.
SECRET : Tnat information or material the
unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably




CONFIDENTIAL : That information or material the
unautnorized iisclosure of wnicn could reasonably
be expected to cause damage to the national
security.
Implicit in this set of definitions, tnere also
exists a classification of information which is not
classified. Tnerefore, one nas four hierarcnical access
classes established by this policy, the intent of which is
to prevent unauthorized disclosure (viz., observation) of
information so classified. Figure 12 shows the access
relation grapn for tnis compromise policy wnicn is referred
to as the basic National Security Policy.
Executive Order 12065 also establisnes [25J tne
authority to originally classify new information.
Information may be classified Top Secret only by officials
designated in writing. Information may be classified Secret
only by officials wno nave Top Secret classifications or cy
officials designated in writing. Information may be
classified Confidential only cy officials witn Top Secret or
Secret classifications or by officials designated in
writing.
In order to obtain access to classified material,
the order indicates that a person must be determined
trustwortny (granted clearance) and tnat access is necessary
in the performance of that persons' duties ("need to Know").
This is a discretionary policy, nowever, and will be
discussed no further. All classified material shall be
41

appropriately and conspicuously marlced to put all persons on
clear notice tnat tne information is classified. Classified




Figure 12. Basic National Security Policy.
2. National Integrity Policy
The dual of tne National Security Policy is the
National Integrity Policy [21J . Motivation for sucn a policy
comes from the desire to prohibit subversion, i.e., trie
unauthorized modification of information. The following set
of integrity classes nave been established for tnis policy
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[21] • Implicit witti this classification scheme, one also nas
information that is not classified.
TOP SECRET : That information or material the
unauthorized modification of which could
reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally
grave damage to the national security.
SECRET : That information or material the
unautnorized modification of wnicn could
reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to
the national security.
CONFIDENTIAL : That information or material the
unauthorized modification of which could
reasonably be expected to cause damage to the
national security.
One further point concerning Integrity Policies must
be emphasized before one proceeds. Generally speaking, one
has a good notion of how to classify information with
respect to security and unautnorized observation, but
classification with respect to integrity is not so easily
identified. In some sense, integrity classification must be
determined by the object's potential importance rather than
by its current Importance. Consider, for example, a simple
sine function tuc&ed away in some obscure user library. If
this function is used to compute trajectories for an
inter-continental ballistic missile, it becomes TOP SECRET
with respect to the National Integrity Policy, wnereas, it
is clearly UNCLASSIFIED with respect to the National
Security Policy. Classification of information witn respect
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to integrity will generally require considerable planning
and foresight [2J .
3. Privacy
The Code of Fair Information Practices and tne
Privacy Act of 1974 establisned tne following basic policy
for the Federal Government [26]
.
(1) There must be no personal data record-Keeping
systems whose very existence is secret.
(2) There must be a way for an individual to find
out what information about him is on record and
now it is used.
(3) Tnere must be a way for an individual to
correct or ammend a record of identifiable
information about him.
(4) There must be a way for an individual to
prevent information about him that obtained, for
one purpose, from being used or made available for
other purposes without his consent.
(5) Any organization creatine, maintaining, usin?
or disseminating records of identifiable personal
data must guarantee tne reliability of the data
for their intended use and must taice precautions
to prevent misuse.
All information systems (including computer systems)
used by tne Federal Government are subject to these privacy
requirements and must incorporate a corresponding set of
safeguards when the process "Privacy Information."
These three policies are applicable to many Federal
data processing applications. Numerous other
non-discretionary policies exist botn in tne Federal, State,
and Local governments and in private industry. It has been
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shown in this section that these policies may be precisely
described using access relation erapns or linear access
graphs as described in this section. Once a policy has been




Ill . A FORMALIZ£D NOTION OF DOMAINS
The notion of a "domain" has not been clearly presented
in a precise manner, nor properly defined. Dennis [5J
introduced the concept by describing a "sphere of
protection." Lampson [6J refined tne concept, coining the
term "domain", and defined a domain as a *roup of
capabilities or protected names. Scnroeder [Bj maintains
Lampson's definition, hut provides an in-depth discussion
and presentation of his ideas, many of wnicn were
instrumental in the formulation of the concepts presented
nere. Scnroeder further refined the ideas from nis tnesis,
and together with Saltzer [l4j, defines a domain as a set of
objects that may be accessed by a principal. This definition
is the most commonly accepted today, but for any rigorous
discussion of iomains, or for presentation of a concept su~h
as tne assignment technique, a more formalized definition is
needed.
An access domain A, is a tuple, (a,, a 2 , .... a., ...,
a ), where n is the number of primitive (non-decomposable)
access modes in the system and a. is the set of all objects,
{ ,, 0„, ...» . , ..., }, accessible by the "i"th12 j m
access mode. An (access mode)-domain is the set of objects
that a process executing in that domain (i.e., a subject)
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has the risrfit, or privilege of, accessing according to the
rules for tnat particular access mode.
Consider the following examples of domains:
A : (Observe(O) :{A} , Modify (M) : {3} )
A
2
: (0:{A,B,C}, M:{A,E,C} )
A
3
: (0:{A,C,D>, M:{^} )
A
4
: (0:{A,B,C,D>, M:{A,B,C,D} )
The observe-domain of A, (denoted as OA, ) is object A
and the modify-domain MA., is object B. Note that simply
referring to A., as containing objects A and E would not
provide much insight into the true nature of this domain
[141.
The notion of "dominance" with respect to domains was
introduced by Srohn [16] . These notions are refined from
security dominance and integrity dominance to a more general
definition of dominance.
A domain, A i dominates ( °< ) A. if and only if (iff)
for each access mode a , aAj j£. aA^. This is
particularly useful wnen discussing the relationship
between domains with respect to access modes. One can say
tnat for some cl , sl a . «<: a. A . iff u. c, \A. .


















,-v a but A- does not dominate A, • Similar examples
can be formulated by the reader.
Dominance domains may te labeled for convenience. In tne
Multics system, for example, the dominance domains
established by tne ring mecnanism were Known as rings and
were labeled by ring numbers. Schroeder's protection
mechanism also uses numbers as labels for dominance domains
[8J.
The systems protection mechanisms establish a set of
dominance domains that can be used for evaluating the
protection mechanisms. These dominance domains dominate all
domains that currently exist or may exist within the system.
If one can establish the set of dominance domains for the
system and one can snow that tne policy holds for these
domains, then one can show that the policy holds for all
domains.
A mechanism, in the most general sense, is something
that prevents the occurrence of certain sequences of
operations [15]. A protection mechanism, or an access
control mechanism, can be defined, as sometning that prevents
the unauthorized access of information. In the broadest
sense, one may include as protection mechanisms such things
as walls, patrol dogs and cypher locks. More specifically,
tnough, a protection mecnanism for a computer operating
system is a procedure, implemented in software, firmware (if
there is such a thing) or hardware, that prohibits tne
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access of objects witttin a system such that the domain of
any process is dominated by some particular dominance domain
inherently established by the protection mechanisms.
Figure 13. Multics Rings
The Multics Ring Mechanism [2SJ is a well Known
protection mechanism that provides an excellent example for
the discussion of dominance domains. One may thins of these
dominance domains as a set of concentric rings (illustrated
in figure 13), each numbered in increasing order from tie
inner-most ring or Kernel. The Kernel is conventionally
assigned ring number zero.
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The Multics Ring Mechanism determines the authorized
access of a subject by means of tne current ring number (r)
that specifies the dominance domain. Discrimination among
objects is by means of a ring bracket. The ring bracket is a
three-tuple (Rl, R2, R3 ) where Rl , R2, and R3 are ring
numbers and Rl must be numerically less tnan or equal to R2
which is less than or equal to R3. Access is characterized









Figure 14. Multics Ring Mechanism Linear Access Graph
Consider now a system that uses tne Multics Ring
Mechanism and discriminates among four distinct hierarchical
rings (0 tnru 3). One may tnink of tne domains establisned
by this system as A Q , A 1 , A 2 , and A 3 . Consider tne
rules of access established in figure 14 t wnere MA is tie
objects that may be modified by a process in domain 0. Then
MA
Q
o*- MA, MA. MA. . Likewise , A Q OA.
OA. OA_. No such relationship exists for execute or
call (as a gate). EA_ does not <*? EA
2 ,
as R2 may be 2 for
some object X, in which case X € EA but X f^ *& 3 .
Likewise CA- (the Call (as a gate) domain of A ) does not
°* CA
2
as R3 may be zero, for example, in which case, Rl
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and R2 must be zero, ruling out the possibility of
successive dominance call-domains.
Note that a single object may be a member of several
dominance domains. Some object X, with rinff brackets (2,2,3),
is a member of Oa , 0A X , 3A 2 t MA . Ea q , 2& 1 , Ea 2 , and
CA 3 . Therefore, X €. A Q , A,, A 2 and A^. This concept
can be confusing as an object is a distinct entity generally
represented by a single imace.
This section has established a formal definition of
domains suitable for discussion of complex domain related
issues. Tne notion of dominance domains was introduced and
their relationship to protection mechanisms established. The
Multics Ring Mechanism provided an example of the means by
which one may evaluate tne dominance domains established by
a protection mechanism. Having formulaized these concepts,
the relationship between policy and mechanism may now be
investigated in an organized manner.
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IV. THE ASSIGNMENT TECHNIQUE
This section introduces a mathematical framework for
evaluating the relationship between non-discretionary
security policies and protection mechanisms. An evaluation
approach, termed "Tne Assignment Technique", utilizes the
entity - relationship model in establishing an assignment
between the security classes of information establisned by
the policy constraints, and dominance domains, established
by the properties of the mecnanism. The assignment tecnnique
provides a theoretical foundation for assessing the
sufficiency of an access control mecnanism with respect to a
well formed protection policy.
This section begins with a general discussion of tne
meaning of "assignment". It then proceeds to introduce the
assignment tecnnique in a general form. The section
concludes wi tn a simplification of the assignment tecnnique
made possible by tne lattice nature of non-discretionary
security policies.
A. ASSIGNMENT
Assignment is the establishment of a relationsnip
between two entities such that the first entity is "assigned
to" the second entity. Matnematlcaliy , tne term assignment
is not significant. One could easily have said that entity 1
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is related to entity 2. Intuitively, however, assignment is,
associated witn tne connotation "to fix autnoritati vely" .
This precisely describes the manner in which tnis
relationship is establisned.
Assignment may be denoted by a grapn from the first
entity to the second as follows:
is assigned to
-> (ENTITY 2
It is important to recognize that assignment does not
alter either entity. Assignment is merely the act of
associating an entity or set of entities with some other
entity or set of entities.
Another way to describe assignment is in terms of tne
act of forming a tuple (entity 1, entity 2). Additionally,
one may thinfc of assignment as a function (i.e., "is
assigned to") where the assignment process establishes a
mapping between two otnerwise disjoint entities. Regardless
of the context of discussion or the symbolism used, one may
sinply thinfc of assignment as tne act of associating one
thing with another.
B. THE TECHNIQUE
The essence of the assignment technique is relatively
simple. First of all, consider the nature of a lattice
security policy. Such a policy partitions tne objects of a
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system into a lattice of equivalence classes labeled by the
access classes as discussed in section II. Eacn equivalence
class can be thought of as an entity that may be subject to
assignment.
Then consider a mechanism, which establishes a lattice
of dominance domains as discussed in section III. Each of
these domains can also be thought of as an entity that may
be subject to assignment.
Since an assignment can be establisned between any two
entities, one can ma&e an assignment between the equivalence
classes established by a lattice security policy and the
dominance domains established by some protection mechanism.
One may tnen validate that (for this assignment) tne
mechanism is sufficient to support this policy. This
validation is made by examining the set of access relations
that the mechanism permits, and testing for possible
violations of the policy.
Tne assignment tecnnique can be described more
systematically as follows:
1) Determine if tne policy is a lattice
policy. If not, the assignment technique does not
apply.
2) Establish the set of equivalence classes,
{ e\ , e2 •••» e^ , ..., 6p >, that are
associated with each access class.
3) Determine tne set of dominance domains,
{ A lf A 2 , ..., A ..., A } t that are
established by tne systems protection mechanism.
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4) Make an assignment from e, to A .k g
5) For tnis assignment, examine tne access
relations permitted by tne mecnanism, testing for
possible violations of tne policy.
6) If no violations can exist, tne mecnanism
is sufficient for tne policy in question.
Step 4 of tne assignment metnod allows for considerable
flexibility in the manner in wnicn assignments can be made.
Any possible mapping from equivalence classes to dominance
do-nains may be considered. Tnis flexibility, nowever,
implies considerable effort in order to determine tnat a
mechanism is not sufficient for a given policy. Fortunately,
in tnis tnesls one is specifically dealing witn tne security
issue. Because of this, several refinements can be made tnat
greatly simplify this tasK.
C. SIMPLE ASSIGNMENT
The question of how one chooses to mate assignments
(i.e., the cnoice of an assignment scneme) may seem
relatively complex upon first inspection of the assignment
technique. The problem, nowever, becomes almost trivial when
dealing witn simple non-discretionary security policies as
is shown by the following arguments.
First of all, it is clear tnat tne equivalence classes
(established by the policy constraints) represent distinct
access classes. It is also clear tnat tne dominance domains
represent distinct sets of objects. If more than one
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equivalence class were assigned to tne same dominance
domain, then there is nothing in tne mechanism to
distinguish between tne access classes. £ut tne policy does
draw some distinctions Between these access classes (i.e.,
tnat distinction established by tne definition of tne access
classes), so it would not be possible to enforce tne policy
with such an assignment. All such assignments can be
eliminated, a priori.
On the other hand, if one equivalence class was assigned
to more than one dominance domain, tnen some distinction is
bein* made for an access class that is not specified in the
policy. In some cases, one may find that sucn distinctions
produce violations of the policy. Although other cases may
not do so, tnese extra dominance domains are unnecessary,
providing distinctions which have no significance.
Tnerefore, tne numDer of dominance domains of interest
established by the mechanisms should be equal to the number
of access classes established by the policies.
One may attempt to argue tnat mere may exist dominance
domains that do not receive an assignment. Such domains,
however, must be either empty or in no way allow for an
exception to the enforcement of the policy. As such, one
need not be concerned with the question of tneir existence.
One need only concentrate on the dominance domains for which
the assignment was made.
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Considering assignment as a function, it has been
established that tne only assignment scnemes of interest are
bijective (i.e., a one to one and onto relationship between
the access classes and the dominance domains 122]). This
provides some improvement, but one is still faced with at
least pf possible assignment schemes to evaluate (where p is
the number of access classes established by tne policy).
One may eain considerable improvement, however, by only
attempting to validate one simple mechanism witn respect to
one simple policy at a time. Furthermore, the Knowledge of
partially ordered sets may be used to mate our assignments
in a very selective manner. This is done by first requiring
tnat tne lattice for tne dominance domains of Interest that
one considers for assignment, be an isomorphic image of that
for the equivalence classes. This may not be a necessary
condition, however, it in no way invalidates the results
shown (as one would otherwise be dealing with an isomorphic
sub-image established by the necnanism), and it is neipful
in this discussion.
When considering the isomorphic ima^e of a lattice, the
problem of assignment is reduced to a question of
orientation. One may either assign the greatest lower bound
of tne lattice to tne greatest lower bound of tne image, or
assign the greatest lower bound of the lattice to the least
upper bound of tne image. Any other assignment would not be
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acceptable as it would violate the ordering or the lattice
or of the image
.
So for a system of V isomorphic images of the lattice
established by the policy, one need only consider at most,
21c assignment schemes. In most practical cases, when the
mechanism establishes isomorphic images which are identical
in their access control properties because of the uniform
nature of the mechanism, one need consider only 2 assignment
schemes.
The Simple Assignment Theorem : For any simple
lattice policy and an isomorphic image established
by some protection mechanism, no more than two
assignment schemes are necessary to validate the
sufficiency of tne mecnanism to enforce the
policy.
Proof Slcetcn : Tne proof proceeds by snowing
that two assignment schemes are reasonable and
that all others are not.
1) Mate assignments starting from tne greatest
lower bound (GLB) of the lattice to the GLB of the
isomorphic image. Tnen assign every reachable
access class (i.e., those of unit distance) to a
reachable dominance domain in the isomorphic
image. Next assign all reachable access classes
from those just assigned (which are not already
assigned) to a corresponding reachable dominance
domain. Proceed in this fashion until all access
classes nave been assigned. An assignment sucn as
58

tnat snown in figure 15 will result, wnere tne L'JE
is assiened to tne LUB, A is assigned to A', E is
assigned to B' t and so t'ortn.
This assi?nment is a valid assignment in that
an assignment can be Tiaae from tne access classes
to tne dominance domains tnat is not inherently
incorrect and tnerefore is worthy of
consideration. Tnis does not mean tnat tne
protection mecnanism is sufficient for tnis
assignment. It only implies tnat sucn an
assignment scneme is wortny of consideration.
ACCESS CLASSES DOMINANCE DOMAINS
Figure 15. GIB to GLB Assignment
2) Now consider a second practical assignment.
This assignment starts from tne SLB of tne lattice
mating an assignment to tne LUB of tne isomorpnic
image and proceeding as in the first assignment
scheme. The resulting assignment is illustrated in
figure 16 wnere tne LOB is assigned to tne GIB, A




ACCESS CLASSES DOMINANCE DOMAINS
Figure 16. SLB to LUB Assignment.
It is important to note tnat if tne lattice
structure is not uniform, i.e., inverting tne
lattice rfouli not produce tne same image, tnen
only one of tne two aforementioned assignment
scnemes will De successful. THis limitation occurs
because one encounters some set of reachable
access classes luring assignment tnat nave no
corresponding reachable dominance domains.
However, for any lattice structure, uniform or
otherwise, there will always be one assignment
scnene to an isomorphic image tnat is worthy of
consideration. This leads us to the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 . For any lattice policy and
an isomorphic image established by some
protection mechanism, there exists at
least one valid assignment scneme.
Proof Sfcetch (Corollary 1) : The proof
is trivial from the definition of an
isomorphic image. If a lattice has an
isomorphic image, tnen at least one
ordering of nodes in tne image is
identical to the ordering of nodes in
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tne lattice, therefore, tnis ordering is
wortny of consideration.
3) Now consider tne assignment of the GL£
access class to any dominance domain otner than
tne LUB or tne GLB. If tnis is done* then some
otner access class must be assigned to tne LUB
dominance domain and still anotner access class
:nust be assigned to tne GLB dominance domain. But
if the isomorphic image is to maintain the
ordering of tne access classes, tnen tnere exists
some ordering which is not valid because either
tne GLB or tne LUB of tne isomorpnic image is to
be considered less than tne GLB (in the image)
wnicn must be tne least element (viz., least
sensitive) according to the poliry. Therefore,
such an assignment can never be valid. Tnus one is
reduced to tne tas£ of considering only two
possible assignment schemes of interest.
One can furtner simplify the assignment technique by
combining steps 4 and b. This is accomplished by maKin?. an
assignment and examining all access relations producible
immediantly. If an access relation is not valid, one can
quickly determine that tne assignment scheme in use will not
validate the sufficiency of the mechanism.
Wnen one is dealing with more complex lattice
structures, one is faced with two alternatives. One can
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either validate tne sufficiency of tne mechanism for eacn
sub-policy, es tablishing tnat if each sub-policy is
enforced, then the complex policy is enforced, or one may
choose to validate the complex policy by a straight forward
assignment. rfhen using a straight forward assignment
approach, one must remember that tne Simple Assignment
Theorem may not apply. This is of no particular consequence
when validating a protection mecnanism designed for a
particular policy where the assignments are chosen
carefully. Eowever, establishing the insufficiency of an
arbitrary mecnanism may require considerably more effort.
The basic principles associated with the assignment
technique nave been presented in this section. One may now




V. MECHANISM SUFFICIENCY VALIDATION J3Y ASSIGNMENT
One of the most practical uses for the assignment
technique is sufficiency validation of protection mecnanisms
(i.e., validation of their ability to enforce security
policies) [4j . In contrast to other validation techniques
[ll t l7J f ttie assignment technique presents a metnod wnose
mathematical model (i.e., the entity-relationship model) is
based upon the nature of security itself, rather than otner
methods whicft adapt the nature of security into a form
designed to mesh vita the prescribed format of some well
Known mathematical model. This section discusses mechanism
sufficiency validation by assignment for several well Known
linear non-discretionary security policies. Although the
principles discussed in this section apply for all lattice
security policies, only linear lattice policies are
discussed in tnis section as tney provide a sufficient
foundation for the discussion of any lattice policy and are
more clearly illustrated in this context.
A. MULTICS RING MECHANISM ASSIGNMENTS
The question of the sufficiency of tne Multlcs Ring
Mechanism for enforcement of the basic National Security
policy was tne initial problem tnat prompted the current
research effort and led to the formulation of tne assignment
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technique. It is appropriate then, that this analysis be
presented as an introductory application of simple
assignment.
1. Compromise Policy
As stated previously in section II, the basic
National Security policy is a simple lattice security
policy. Figure 13 illustrates this policy.
The dominance domains of the Multics Ring Mechanism
are most frequently shown as concentric rings numbered in
increasing integer order from the innermost ring or the
fcernel. The security kernel is generally assigned ring
number 0. For simplicity, only a system with rings thru 3
is shown in this analysis. Assignment to other ring numbers
(such as 2 thru 5 or 4 thru 7) will produce similar results
because of the uniform nature of the Multics Ring Mechanism.
Consider as the first assignment scheme, the
assignment of the TOP SECRET access class (the least upper
bound of the policy) to ring (the least upper bound of the
dominance domains). The assignment produced is illustrated
in figure 17.
Next, according the assignment technique, one must
examine the access relations permitted by the mecnanism and
test for possible violations of the policy. In order to do
so f one must first examine the nature of the Multics Ring
Mechanism more closely. A detailed discussion is given by
Schroeder [27] , however, a simple explanation of the
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pertinent details as used in this discussion is provided for













Figure 17. Basic National Security Assignment 1.
The Multics Ring Mechanism determines the autnorized
access of a process by means of the current ring number (r).
Thus a process wnicn is executing in ring number 1 would
need to be cleared for at least SECRET information according
to this assignment scneme.
The Multics Ring Mechanism discriminates among
objects by means of a ring bracket. The ring bracfcet is a
three-tuple ( Rl, R2 , R3) where Rl, R2 and R3 are ring
numbers and Rl <LR2.£.R3. Access to objects is restricted
such that the current ring of execution must be less than or
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equal to R2 to observe information and less tfian or equal to
Rl to modify information. Figure IS snows characteristics of
tne rins brackets botb in terms of the access modes used in
tnis discussion and tne access modes used in Multics.
Execute (Observe)





Figure 18. Multics Ring Mechanism.
Continuing now with tne examination of access
relations, consider an object that is classified as SECRET.
Sucn an object must be assigned a ring bracket sucn tnat it
may be observed by processes in ring and ring 1 only. R2
must tnerefore be 1. This presents a problem. No matter what
value one may choose for Rl , a contradiction occurs. If Rl
is or 1 tnen TOP SECRET processes may modify SECRET files
violating the Confinement Property. If Rl is greater tnan 1,
tne restrictions of tne ring mecnanism would be violated
(viz., Rl > R2). Tnerefore, one can conclude tnat this
assignment is not acceptable.
Consider now tne only other potential assignment
scheme where tne greatest lower bound of the lattice (the
UNCLASSIFIED access class) is assigned to ring 0. This
assignment is illustrated in figure 19.
One may now attempt to assign ring brackets to an
object classified SECRET. A problem occurs immediately. One
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wants processes executing in ring 2 to observe SECRET
objects, but tnen a process in Tins (i.e., an UNCLASSIFIED
process), will also be able to observe tne object. Tie
Simple Security Condition cannot be enforced witn tnis













Figure 19. Basic National Security Assignment 2.
Since neither of tnese assignments are acceptable,
and snifting tne ring assignments numerically would yield
similar results, one can see tbat no assignment will be
acceptable. Therefore, the Multics Ring Mecnanism is not






The basic National Integrity policy L21J is tne dual
of the basic National Security policy. Wnereas tne security
policy is concerned with the unautnorizea . observation of
information or compromise, tne integrity policy is concerned
with the unauthorized modification of information or
subversion as discussed in section II.
Consider first tne assignment of the TOP SECRET
access class (the least upper bound for the lattice
established by the policy) to Ring (the least upper bound
for the dominance domains established by the mechanism). The















Figure 20. Basic National Integrity Assignment 1.
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One nay now examine tne access relations wnicn tne
Multics Ring Mecnanism will permit (as snown in figure 19)
and test for possible violations of tne policy. In so doing,
one encounters violations almost immediently. One wishes to
nave a process executing in Ring 1 (i.e., a SECRET process),
for example, to be able to observe TOP SECRET objects in
Ring 0, but tne mecnanism pronibits tnis observation.
Additionally, a SECRET process could observe CONFIDENTIAL
information violating tne Integrity Confinement Property.











Figure 21. Basic National Integrity Assignment 2.
Consider now the only other potential assignment
scneme (viz., according to tne Simple Assignment Theorem)
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wnere trie TOP SECRET equivalence class is assigned to Rim?
3. This assignment scneme is illustrated in figure 21.
Examining tnis assignment, consider an object tnat
is classified as SECRET. Sucn an object must be assigned a
ring bracket sucn tnat it may be observed by processes in
Ring 0, Ring 1 and Ring 2 only, so R2 must be assigned 2.
.But if R2 is 2, one is faced with a contradiction in the
assignment of Rl. If Rl is assigned 0, 1 or 2, then a
violation of tne Simple Integrity Condition occurs because
UNCLASSIFIED subjects may then modify SECRET objects. If Rl
is assigned 3. tne Ring Bracket constraints are violated.
Therefore, this assignment scheme fails to provide an
assignment where the protection mechanism can enforce this
policy.
According to the Simple Assignment Theorem, there
are no other assignments wortny of consideration. Therefore,
the Multics Ring Mechanism is not sufficient to enforce this
policy either.
So far, it has been shown that the Multics ^ing
Mechanism is not sufficient to enforce the basic National
Security policy nor the basic National Integrity policy.
However, a Multics Security Kernel has been designed [28,29J
that is sufficient to support both of these policies. This
may seem to be a contradiction but it is not. Tne confusion
is dissipated when one asfcs the question, "Wnat form of
policy does the Multics Rins Mechanism support?"
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3. Program Integrity Policy
The general form of Program Integrity policies was
introduced in section II. Consider now tne specific program








Figure 22. A Program Integrity Policy.
According to this policy, entities are partitioned
into one of four access classes designated as User,
Supervisor, Qtility or Kernel. The sensitivity of these
access classes is specified as : Kernel > Supervisor >
Utility > User. An assignment to a Multics ring structure is
made as shown in figure 23.
Recalling tne cnaracteristi cs of ring brackets snown
in figure IB, "Max" is designated as Ring 0, the program
integrity access class (PI) as Rl and "Min" as R2. One may
note that for this policy any choice for R2 greater than or
equal to Rl will do. Tnis analysis, nowever, nas fixed R2 at
3.
According to tne assignment tecnnique, one must now
examine the access relations permitted by the mecnanism and
test for possible violations of tne policy. Unliire previous
examples, where the mechanism was obviously not sufficient
to support the policy (i.e., only a single counter-example
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was necessary) this example examines a policy tnat is lively
to be supported by the Multics Ring Mechanism. Knowing this,
it seems appropriate to present a more careful approacn for

















Figure 23. Program Integrity Assignment 1.
For simplicity, one may refer to eQ {tne first
equivalence class) as Kernel (i.e., tne access class tnat
labels this equivalence class of subjects and objects), e
as Supervisor, e as Utility and e as User. One may also
refer to AQ (the first dominance domain established by tne
Multics Ring Mechanism) as Ring 0, A, as Ring 1, A
2
as
Ring 2 and A
3
as Ring 3. The assignment scneme consists of
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assigning e to a (Kernel to Ring 0), e to a, (Supervisor
to Rine 1), e
2
to a 2




to Ring 3). One can now evaluate the access relations
permitted by tne Multics Ring Mechanism and compare them
witn tne policy.
Examining tne read access first, one notes that tne
Multics Ring Mechanism provides no discrimination for read
access since R2 is fixed at 3 for ail objects. Thus subjects
in A
Q ,
A lf A 2
or a
3
nay read objects in a
q
, A, ( A
2
and A... This corresponds with tne access rights of tne
policy wnicn states tnat subjects in e , e , e or e may
read objects in e , e , e and e . Therefore, tfte mechanism
is sufficient witn respect to tne read access relations.
Next, examining the modify access relations one may
observe that MA Q o* i^ oc ma 2 o*. Ma 3 . Thus a subject
in A
Q




or A- . This
corresponds to tne access rignts of the Kernel access class
in that a subject in e may modify objects in e , e , e and
e_ . Examining A,, one observes tnat a subject in a, may
modify objects in a, » A 9 or a 7 out not in A n • This
corresponds with tne access rignts of tne Supervisor access
class in that a subject in e may modify objects in e , e
and e
3
but not in e . Examining A , one observes that a
subject in A
2





A Q or A,. This corresponds with the access rights of
the Utility access class in tnat a subject in e may modify
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objects in e or e but not in e or e . Finally,
examining a , one observes that a subject in a may only
modify objects in A 3 « This corresponds with the access
rights of the User access class in tnat a subject in e.
may only modify objects in e 3 . Therefore, the Multics
Ring Mecnanism is sufficient to support this policy with
respect to modify access relations.







<=>< XA Q . This is Just
the inverse of the modify access relations. Thus a subject
in A
3
may execute objects in A Q , A,, A 2 or A.,. This
corresponds to the access rights of the User access class in
that a subject in e
3





one observes that a subject in A may
execute objects in A Q , A., or A 2 but not in A . This
corresponds with the access rights of the Utility access-
class in that a subject in e
2
may execute objects in e
n
, e..
and e 2 but not in e 3 . Examining A, , one observes that a
subject in A 1 may execute objects in A Q or A, but not
in A 2 or A 3 . This corresponds with the access rights
of the Supervisor access class in tnat a subject in e, may
execute objects in e Q or e-, but not in e2 or e3 .
Finally, examining A Q , one observes that a subject in A Q
may only execute objects in A Q . This corresponds with the
access rights of the Kernel access class in that a subject
in eQ may only execute objects in en . Therefore, tbe
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Multics Ring Mechanism is sufficient to support tnis policy
with respect to execute access relations.
So one may observe mat for eacn of tne access modes
(read, modify and execute), tne Multics Ring Mechanism is
sufficient to enforce tne policy. Therefore, for tnis
assignment, no violations are possible, thus proving* that
tne Multics Ring Mecnanism is sufficient to support tnis
Program Integrity policy.
B. OTHER RING MECHANISMS
The Multics Ring Mecnanism is by no means tne only form
of Ring: Mechanism. By altering- the requirements of the Ring-
Brackets and tne need for a Gate Keeper, one can contemplate
adapting the rine mechanisms to meet other simple
hierarchical policies.
Consider using the assignment shown in figure 17, but
altering tne means of discrimination among objects such mat
the Ring Bracfcet is a singleton (Rl). Following the rules
shown in figure 24, one can adapt tnis ring mechanism to
enforce the basic National Security policy.
,
Modify
> KERNEL IR1| MAX
Observe
Figure 24. Security Rings.
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Similary, figure 25 snows the rules necessary for the
same assignment as snown in figure 20 to adapt tnis ring




Figure 25. Integrity Rings.
To be sure, tnese brief suggestions do not completely
characterize a practical protection mechanism. However, it
appears tnat ring mechanisms are adaptable for tne
enforcement of various simple hierarchical policies.
C. CAPABILITY MECHANISMS
Considerable effort is currently underway to provide
"Provably Secure Operating System" based upon the capability
mechanism [30,31]. It is important to examine what form of
protection capaoilities actually provide.
Capability mechanisms primarily establish two dominance
domains tnat are enforced by tnis system hardware mechanism.
One domain consists of capabilities, and the other is
objects tnat are not capabilities such as segments and
directories. A process talces no note of these dominance
domains, however, because all processes have access to
capabilities as well as other types of objects. So with
respect to a process, the capability mecnanism provides no
inherent partitioning of tne system entities at all. In
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fact, in trying to determine tne structure of dominance
domains for non-capability objects, one encounters a
veritable "spaghetti towl" of domains, devoid of any
innerent, unifying structure. Thus a capability mechanism is
of itself not sufficient for the enforcement of any
non-discretionary security policy. Enforcement of
non-discretionary security policies (i.e., those of primary
interest to National Defense) must be accomplished by some
otner add-on mechanism.
This is not to say that a capability mechanism is not
useful. For example, the mechanism can protect a security
Kernel in much tne same way as rings protect tne Kernel in
the Multics design.
The usefulness of the assignment technique in validating
the suitability of a protection mechanism to enforce a
security policy has been examined in this section. The




This research nas explored the foundations of
non-discretionary security, discovering an effective
methodology for assessing tne sufficiency of a protection
mechanism to enforce a non-discretionary security policy. By
formalizing tne notion of a domain [6,7J , and using a formal
notion of non-discretionary security [3], the inseparable
nature of protection mecnanisms and security policies has
been established. This section considers some future
directions for research and summarizes the principle
findings of the author.
A. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Although this author's investigation has provided some
structure to the complex nature of security, considerable
researcn is still needed. The relationsnip between
protection mechanisms and other operating systems mechanisms
is not clear. Sucn issues as seriaii zabili ty
,
synchronization and distributed processing may add new
dimensions to tne meaning of protection. Fundamental
limitations regarding implementation details remain unknown.
Additionally, one can consider tne formalization of
policy specifications in general. Can the enforcement of any
policies other than lattice policies be evaluated? Can all
78

enforceable policies be represented, in some common form such
as a lattice?
One of tne most difficult problems in actually enforcing
any security policy is tne maintenance of unique
non-forgeabie attributes [oj associated witn tne subjects
and objects. A mechanism for maintaining the uniqueness of
tnese attributes may be called an "isolation mecnanism"
because it isolates those subjects that may access these
attributes from tnose tnat may not. This does not prevent
sharing of objects but simply provides a means of isolating
tnese attributes from general unprotected usage. Both tne
capability mecnanism [30,31] and the notion of a ?ate
(mecnanism) [3,28J appear to be isolation mecnanisms. A
comprehensive study of tnis problem is beyond the scope of
this discussion. However, a few observations concerning
isolation noted during this research are provided.
Tne fundamental principles upon wnicn an isolation
mechanism must rely is the notion of a segment (i.e., an
atomic unit of information storage for wnicn tne access
class is identified) and the tranquillity principle (i.e.,
the notion tnat tne access class for a subject or an object
does not caange during the course of computations) [17J . If
these two principles are not enforced, it is not clear now




Tne tranquillity principle does not strictly apply to
processes. In Multics, for example, processes had several
domains of execution. However, since a suDject is defined as
a process-domain pair, one mignt at first suspect tnat a
process executing in multiple domains does not present a
security problem. Tnis is not always tne case, particularly
when dealing with policies that attempt to limit tne
information flow [13J
.
When attempting to enforce tne National Security Policy
in a multi-user, multi-process environment, wnere a process
executes in a sequential fashion (i.e., the process is
serializabie) one can do no better tnan to allow a process
to proceed to its "high water mark:" and then terminate at
that level. Any attempt to revert to a less sensitive access
class will result in a potential compromise. For example,
consider the compromise technique shown in figure 26.
In this example, a malicious agent utilizes the feature
of sequential processes and the basic PV synchronization
mecnanism [33] to take tne "info" in Dominance Domain 2 and
copy it into Dominance Domain 1. In order to do so, the
agent calls procedures placed in the "High" domain by
subversion [3], relyine only upon one process (i.e., PROCESS
or PROCESS 1) to return, thus providing the information in
binary form to tne "Low" domain. Thus by serialization and
process synchronization alone, tne isolation of the




Domain 1 ( Low )
Dominance
Domain 2 ( Rieb )
Initial State ;
XXX ...








Pointer ;= Pointer + i;
P(2);




PROCESS ("Get a Zero")
L2; CALL ZeroProc






PROCESS 1 ("Get a One")
L3; CALL OneProc
IF Gotlt = 0,







IF Info (Pointer) = 0,
THEN RETURN;
IF Gotlt = 0,
THEN GO TO Sli
RETURN.
OneProc
IF Info (Pointer) = 1,
THEN RETURN
;
S2: IF Gotlt = 0,
THEN GO TO S2J
RETURN.
Final State;
copy 101 HZ? Info 101 ZZP
Figure 26. Serialization Problem.
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Note tnat were tne processes to act independently in
eacn dominance domain (i.e., processes are seriaiizabie only
witn respect to a given dominance domain or syncnroni zation
between two processes is not possible) this compromise could
not occur. In general, tnis example snows tnat
syncbronization of processes, serialization of processes and
secure computations are fundamentally related in some
fasnion. Tne exact nature of tnis reiationsnip is not clear.
B. RESULTS
Tne assignment tecnnique nas been snown to be a useful
method for validating tne sufficiency of a protection
mechanism to enforce non-discretionary security policies.
This method provides considerable insight into the nature of
access control. One may observe tnat non-discretionary
security is dependent only upon tne dominance domains
established by tne systems mecnanisms and tneir associated
permissible access relations. The nature of tne computation
is of no concern.
Any non-discretionary security policy for whicn tne
access classes and access relations can be enumerated, can
be enforced in a theoretical sense. Actual implementation,
however, is dependent upon the systems' isolation mecnanism.
No policy can be enforced, in a practical sense, unless tne
system can maintain unique non-f orgeable attributes.
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Protection mecnanisms innerently mirror tne policies
that they enforce. Non-discretionary Security policies form
a lattice of access classes tnat may be mapped to an
isomorphic image of dominance domains, innerently
established by the protection mechanism. Since this has been
shown, one need not illustrate separate lattices for both
policy and mechanism. One unified description for both the
lattice policy and its image established by the protection
mechanism is sufficient for general systems design
considerations .
One may also consider approaching tne assignment
technique from the mechanism point of view. The question
then becomes, "Given some general Protection Mecnanism, what
form of policies will it support?" An absolute answer to
this question is, in general, not available. However, one
can make an evaluation for tnose policies that are of
current interest. Thus , tne assignment tecnnique gives one a
forum in which to consider the usefulness of protection
mechanisms for specific policies of interest.
"Uniform protection mecnanisms," i.e., those mechanisms
forming lattice structures of dominance domains wnere tne
access relations between any two antisymmetric dominance
domains are identical, may be represented by linear access
graphs in the same manner as a policy. Wnen the linear
access srraph for the policy is similar to the linear access
grapn for the mechanism, one can see that for a carefully
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chosen assignment scfieme, tne protection mecnanisn will
enforce tne security policy.
One nay consiier tne development cf a taxonomy of
uniform protection mecnanisms cased upon tne nature of tne
access control tnat eacn enforces. Sucn a taxonomy is beyond
tne scope of this discussion, however, tne linear access
graphs illustrated tnrougnout tnis text may be neipfui in
initiating sucn an effort.
The protection provided by tne Multics Ring Mecnanism
appears to be precisely the issue tnat Wuif, Jones and tne
otner designers of tne "HYDRA" system were attempting to
understand [1SJ . They introduce their discussion by first
saying :
"Protection is, in our view, a mechanism." [18
J
Their discussion tnen proceeds to make tne following
general statement relative to the Multics rings:
Our rejection of nlerarcnical system
structures and especially ones which employ a
single nlerarcnical relation for all aspects of
system interaction, is also, in part, a
consequence of the distinction between protection
and security. A failure to distinguish tnese
issues coupled with a strict nlerarcnical
structure leads inevitably to a succession of
increasingly privileged system^ components, and
ultimately to a "most privileged" one, which gain
their privilege exclusively by virtue of their
position in tne hierarchy. Sucn structures are
inherently wrong ..." [lBj
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Had trie assignment tecnnique been available to the
autnors of tne above statement, tney would nave been
afforded a means of expressing tneir views more precisely
tnan tne ambiguous pnrase
" innerently wrong ". Tne assignment
tecnnique provides a precise means for clearly formulating
sucn an observation and evaluating its validity. As snown in
section V, and in agreement with tfulfs' statement, tne
Muitics Ring Mecnanism is
"
innerently wrong " witn respect to
compromise policies. On tne other hand, the Muitics Ring
Mecnanism is
"
.lust rignt " as a means of enforcing a program
integrity policy or assisting in tne enforcement of the
systems hierarchical as well as non-hierarchical security
policies (viz., via Security Kernels).
Additionally, in the same report [19] the authors mate
tne following observation with respect to tneir overall
design methodology :
Among tne major causes of our inability to
experiment with, and adapt, existing operating
systems is their failure to properly separate
mechanisms from policy." [iej
The assignment technique has shown, however, that
lattice security policies and protection mecnanisms tnat
enforce these policies are inextricablely related.
Recognizing this inseparability should provide considerable
insight into current efforts in this area.
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Overall, assignment researcn nas providea a matnematicai
methodology for unifying tde discussion of security related
issues. One may now properly refer to an access mode as a
realization of an access right, a dominance domain as a
realization of an access class and a protection mecnanism as




1. Scnell, R. R. v "Computer Security: Tne Achilles' Heel
of tne Electronic Air Force? , Air University Review ,
Jan-Feb 1979, p. lb-32.
2. Myers, P. A., Subversion: The Neglected Aspect of
Computer Security . Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, June 19843.
3. Scnell, R. R., "Security Kernels: A Metnodical Design
of System Security," USE Technical papers (Spring
Conference, 1979) , Marcn 1979, p. 245-250
.
4. Shirley, L, J. and Scnell, R. H, t "Mechanism
Sufficiency Validation by Assignment," Proceedings of
Second IEE5 Symposium on Privacy and Security, in
preparation.
5. Dennis, J. B. and Van Horn, E. C, "Programming
Semantics for Mul tiprogrammed Computations," Commun-
ications of the ACM , March 1966, p. 143-155.
6. Lampson, B. W., "Dynamic Protection Structures", AFIPS
Conf. Proc. 35 , FJCC 1969, p. 27-38.
7. Lampson, B. W., "Protection", Proceedings Fifth Annual
Conference on Information Sciences and Systems .
Princeton University, Marcn 1971, p. 437-443.
8. Schroeder, M. D., Cooperation of Mutually Suspicious
Subsystems in a Computer Utility . (AD-750 173). Pn. D.
Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Tecnnology, September
1972.
9. PopeK, G-. J., Access Control Models . Harvard University
Report, ESD-TR-73-106 (AD-761 807), February 1973.
10. Bell, D. E. et. al., Secure Comoutpr Systems.;
Mathematical Foundations . MITRE Corporation Report,
ESD-TR-73-27S-V0L-1, (AD-770 768), November 1973.
11. Furtefc, F. C, A Validation Technique for Computer








12. Walter, K. 3. et. al.. Primitive Models for Computer
Security
,
Case Western Reserve University Report,
ESD-TR-74-117, (AD-778 467), January 1974.
13. Denning, D. E., "A Lattice Model of Secure Information
Flow," Communications of trie ACM . May 1976, p. 236-243.
14. Saltzer, J. H., and Schroeder, M. p., "The Protection
of Information in Computer Systems", Proceedings IEEE ,
September 1975, p. 1278-1303.
15. Cohen, E. S., Problems, Mechanisms and Solutions ,
Ph. D. Tnesis, Carnegie-Mellon University,
AFOSR-TR-77-00005, (AD-A034 955), August 1976.
16. Gronn, M. J., A Model of a Protected Data Management
System , Canadian Commercial Corporation Report
,
ESD-TR-76-289, (AD-A035 256), June 1976.
Bell, D. E. and LaPadula, L. J., Secure Compute^
System: Unified Exposition and Multics Implementation .




18. Wulf W. et. al., Hydra: The Kernel of a Multiprocessor
Operating System . Carnegie-Mellon University Report,
AFOSR-TR-73-1079, (AD-762 514), June 1973.
19. Jones, A. K., "Protection Mechanism Models: Their
Usefullness"
,
in Foundations of Secure Computations , by




, "Formal Methods of Capability-Based
Protection Systems", IEEE Transactions on Computers
.
Marcti 1981, p. 172-181.
21. Biba, K. J., Integrity Considerations for Secure
Computer Systems . MITRE Corporation Report,
ESD-TR-76-372, (AD-A039 324), April 1977.
22. Stanat, D. F., and McAllister, D. F., Discrete
Mathematics in Computer Science . Prentice Hall Inc.,
1977.
23. Gericfce, H., Lattice Theory , Frederick Ungar Co.,
1966.
24. Jones, A. K., Protection in Programmed Systems . Ph. D.
Thesis, Carnegie Mellon University, 1973.
88

25. Office of the President of the United States, Executive
Order 12065 . 26 June 1978.
26. Turn, R. and "are W. H., "Privacy and Security in
Computer Science," American Scientist , 1975.
27. Scnroeder, M. D. and Saltzer, J. H., "k Hardware
Architecture for Implementing Protection Rings,"
Communications of tne ACM
.
March 1972, p. 157-170.
28. Schroeder, M. D. ClarK, D. D., and Saltzer, J. H. , "The
Multlcs Kernel Design Project," Proceedings of Sixth
ACM Symposium on Operating Systems . November 1977,
p. 43-56.
29. Whitmore, J. et. al., Design for Multlcs Security
Enhancements . Honeywell Information Systems Report
,
ESD-TR-74-176, (AD-A030 801), December 1973.
30. Feirtag, R. J. and Neuman, P. G., "The Foundations of a
Provably Secure Operating System (PSOS)", AFIPS




31. Neumann, P. G., Robinson, L., Levitt, K. N., A Provably
Secure Operating System . Stanford Research Institute
Report, (AD-A088 601), June 1975.
32. Department of Defense, DOD 5200. 1R, POD Information
Security Program Requirements .
33. Dijstra, E.W., "The structure of "THE"-Multiprogramming






1. Defense Tecnnical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Post Graduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Office of Research Administration 1
Code 012A
Naval Post Graduate School
Monterey, California 93940
4. Department Chairman, Code 52 2
Department of Computer Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
5. COL Roger R. Schell 5
6940tn ESW
Box 2999
Fort Georsre G. Meade, Md. 20755
6. Lyle A. Cox, Jr., Code 52C1 4
Department of Computer Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
7. Commandant, a. S. Coast Guard (G-FIS) 2
2100 2nd St. S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590
8. Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard (G-PTE) 2
2100 2nd St. S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590
9. Lawrence J. Shirley 10
Commandant, U . S. Coast Guard (G-FIS)




10. James P. Anderson
Box 42
Fort Washington, Pa. 19034:
11. Terry S . Arnold
2333 Camlno Del Rio Soutn
Suite 250
P. 0. Box 20217
San Diego, Ca. 92122
12. J. W. Freeman
Computer Sciences Corp.
803 infest Broad Street
Falls Cfcurcn, Virginia 22046
Attn: Ingrid Mues
13. Bruce Goldstein, Pres.
Executed
1100 Souga Street, Suite BF
San Francisco, Ca. 94109
14. Daniel S. Roblyer
The Aerospace Corporation
P. 0. Box 92957




Santa Monica, Ca. 90405
16. Jonn P. Scnill
Code 8321 Concept Development Brancti
C3 I Sys Dept
Naval Ocean Systems Center
San Dieffo, Ca. 92152
17. Peter S. Taster
The Mitre Corporation
P. 0. Box 208 MS/B-332
Bedford, Mass. 01730
18. Rein Turn
California State University, Northridse





19. Kyle E. White
P. 0. Box 1821
Vandenburg AFB, Ca. 93437
20. John Woodward
Tne Mitre Corporation
P. 0. Box 208
Bedford, Mass. 01730
21. Katnryn Heniger, Code 7503
Naval Research Lab
Washineton, D. C. 20375
22. Joel Trimble, Code 221




Naval Researcn Laboratory Code 7593
Washington, D. C. 20375





25. Prof. Tien. Tao, Code 62TV
Department of Computer Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
26. Lcdr. W. Scnocsley, Code 52SB

















Non-discretionary security validation by
3 2768 001 95339 1
h DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
\
